

mists of the past. Secular social and political thinkers are guilty of a similar evasion when they substitute social approval or its like for the Supreme Being Who is the First Principle of both created things and logical thinking.

In an age when secular thinkers fancy themselves not only the exponents but actually the sole exponents of reason, the Bishops' statement will indeed echo like a voice in the wilderness. But their statement is indeed worthy of those who are the spokesmen of the Eternal World, the *Logos* without which there is no logic.

The hope now beating in our breast should be that man will appreciate and clasp unto himself the Bishops' simple yet probing profound truth.

(For details regarding this year's essay contest, see page 29.)

The modern university has become a great engine of public service. Its faculty of science is expected to work for our health, comfort and defense. Its faculty of arts is supposed to delight us with plays and exhibits and to provide us with critical opinions, if not to lead in community singing. And its faculty of political science is called on to advise government and laity on the pressing problems of the hour. It is unquestionably right that the twentieth-century university should play this practical role. But this conspicuous discharge of social duties has the effect of obscuring from the public—and sometimes from itself—the university's primary task, the fundamental work upon which all the other services depend. That primary task, that fundamental work, is scholarship.

—Jacques Barzun

The kind of work that is appropriate to a university must be determined by the nature and purpose of the institution . . . The university rests on the assumption that there should be somewhere in the state an organization the purpose of which is to think most profoundly about the most important intellectual issues. Its purpose is to illuminate the whole educational system and the speculative and practical issues that confront speculative thinkers and men of action. It is a community that thinks . . . The reputation that research or scholarship as it is generally understood has achieved in American universities does not appear to be justified by the purpose of the university. Painful, detailed work on the accumulation of information on trivial subjects may be good for the character. Painful, detailed accumulation of information on any subject may be good for society . . . it has still not been established that this work should be conducted in a university. To paraphrase Sir Richard Livingstone, "The sign of a good university is the number of subjects that it declines to investigate."

—Robert M. Hutchins

Dr. Stanlis, now at the University of Detroit, taught at Wayne for four years. This is the text of the address given at the Fall Corporate Communion Breakfast, December 13, 1953.

Augustinian Passion and Thomist Reason

Peter Stanlis

In the religious polemics of our forensic world, it is common to make a false antithesis between Scripture and tradition. Yet nothing should be more clear than that both together are necessary for a full and wholly satisfactory religious life. Without Scripture there would not have been, originally, even the beginnings of a religious tradition, and without tradition there could not have been any continuous and authoritative transmission or meaningful fulfillment of Scripture throughout history. For if the Scriptures, despite their figurative language and parables, are the black letter of the Mosaic and Christian law, tradition is the white spirit of Divine revelation, the Holy Ghost of right reason, prudence and temperance, guiding, infusing and animating Christianity. As such, tradition is to Scripture what prescriptive custom and common law are to a fixed inherited constitution.

In the false antithesis between Scripture and tradition, between the Bible and the Church, Protestants have been more guilty than Catholics of a grievous neglect and disavowal of tradition, because the beginnings of Protestantism, so late in history, necessarily involved a repudiation of historical continuity and a denial of the long accepted meaning of apostolic succession. Those Protestants who realized their dilemma attempted to solve their rejection of Christian tradition by returning to what they imagined was the primitive simplicity of the early Church. But each had his own hypothesis and particular values, and from the very outset they begged the whole problem, because the nature of the primitive Church is itself an historical, not a Scriptural, problem. It was only a matter of time before this error, together with their failure to establish a canon for Scripture and to solve the knotty problem of sovereignty, caused Protestantism to disintegrate, to replace the Church with the Bible, and thus, in many cases, to abandon even its own unformed traditions.

It is unnecessary to go into the usual objections that have been so often and so rightly raised against trying to make the private interpretation of Scripture the sole basis of Christianity. The logical inconsistencies of unimaginative literalists have frequently been noted, and generally deserve no refutation. Too often, however, these inconsistencies are attributed not to the men who make them, but to Scripture itself, and Christian revelation thereby suffers in its appeal. It is enough to note that what may seem inconsistent or false in any isolated instance may in the whole context be part of a complex truth. As Dr. Samuel Johnson once remarked, to understand the

New Testament alone requires the study of a lifetime. There is also a question of whether the mind has to be satisfied at every point, and even more, as St. Augustine maintained, whether it is not first necessary to believe in order to understand. It is probably still necessary sometimes to point out the error of those who reject tradition because they believe that only those things which are specifically advocated or forbidden in the Bible constitute Christianity. Three objections to this error will have to suffice. In the first place, where is there anything in the Bible which says that only those things which are in the Bible are to be taken as God's revelation? The idea that the Bible is God's only source of revelation is a human assumption, not a Divine command. Secondly, the man who knows his Bible and knows nothing but his Bible may be said not to know even his Bible. He cannot know how his Bible relates or applies to anything in life, to the past as it shaped the present, or to the present as it may judge itself or the past. A man without any sense of history will get precious little sense from Scripture or from anything else. Finally, also, the man who puts his faith in Scripture alone does not realize that God has other vital forms of revelation—that external nature, the senses, reason and emotion of man, indeed, every natural and supernatural source of knowledge, whether moral or not, reveals to man the indirect working of God's reason and will. In a typically happy phrase, Edmund Burke once defined history as "the known march of the ordinary providence of God." His definition applies to the whole natural order as it is comprehended by man's unaided intellect, for clearly, nothing is more fatal to the intellectual and spiritual life of a Christian than the illusion that tradition is a bucket of ashes, or a worldly impediment to the personal knowledge and love of God. To verify this contention, we have but to examine the role of tradition in Catholic worship, first as an end in itself, then as a vehicle for illuminating the intellectual side of Catholicism in the Augustinian and Thomist traditions.

To those who make the private reading of Scripture everything and our Christian traditions nothing, the vital place of tradition in Catholic worship is sometimes taken to mean that Catholics neglect the reading of Scripture. One might as well say that we neglect to breathe because breathing has become so natural to our lives that we make no particular issue of it. The truth is that Catholic worship, centered in the Sacraments and the Mass, contains the perfect embodiment of Christian Scripture in tradition; it is the living depository of all revelation—Divine, human and natural—the chief source of Divine grace and of the moral precepts necessary to eternal salvation. The drama of the Mass embodies all the Scriptural truths of Christ's Incarnation, life, passion, sacrifice, death and resurrection. Through the prayers, epistles, gospels and sermons at each Mass, during each Church year, the intellect is saturated with the events, parables and doctrines of Scripture, as revealed by the Prophets, Christ and His Disciples. But the Church is too wise to allow the worship of God to depend upon the precarious understanding, the mere personality or the intellectual capability, of any pastor or worshipper. She takes higher ground and lifts Scripture above personality by appealing to the total nature of man. In Catholic worship the good and the true in Scripture are made to be perceived through the beautiful. Through art, through music, through decoration and symbol, through ceremony and liturgical drama, man's whole sensory nature becomes infused with Christ's truth, so that in this bland assimilation of Scripture and art we see, we are made to understand, above all to feel what it is to love and be loved by God. This wisdom of the Church in making art auxiliary to worship has the further virtue of establishing a natural continuity between Catholics in all ages and throughout the world. Through the Sacraments and the Mass, generations of Cath-

olics, dead, living and yet unborn, are linked indissolubly to Scripture in eternal reverence, and this Scriptural unity constitutes the meaning of tradition in Catholic worship.

II

A complete understanding of this spiritual tradition and unity is indispensable for an understanding of the intellectual unity in Catholicism, which is largely embodied in the theology of the Augustinian and Thomist traditions. Coleridge once remarked that every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. Unlike so many other naive philosophical idealists and monists, who ignored, minimized or denied the problem of evil, Coleridge finally came to realize that he had neglected to mention that vast army of the philosophically stillborn whose earthly lives are lived in the apparently unalterable limbo of non-spiritually or the hell of actual depravity. It would be even more significant—and in some ways it is the equivalent—if Coleridge had said that every true Christian is born (or becomes) either an Augustinian or Thomist. Yet it would lead to a totally misleading conclusion to assume that Augustinians and Thomists are two utterly different species of spiritual beings. The terms "Augustinian" and "Thomist" are not air tight and separate compartments; they are merely convenient categories which are helpful in making some very real and necessary theological distinctions. In this sense they serve the same function for theology that the terms "Romanticist" and "Classicist" serve in making distinctions within a literary tradition. In any case it should be clearly understood at the outset that the differences between these theological traditions do not constitute a disunity in the Church; from Christ to the present the unity of the Church in its intellectual as well as its spiritual traditions has been one and inseparable. Of differences among members of the early Church, St. Augustine is supposed to have said: "In essentials unity, in non-essentials liberty, in all things charity." This spirit should always be kept in full view when discussing any differences within the intellectual tradition of Catholicism. We shall see that St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas give different interpretations of how man's reason and will are related in matters of grace. But before we turn to this important consideration, and see the influence of each tradition within the Church, we would do well to determine how far the differences between St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas derive from their historical circumstances and temperaments.

Even a cursory comparison of the state of civil society in the fourth and thirteenth centuries is sufficient to explain why St. Augustine should assume a much darker view of the nature and destiny of man than that taken by St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Augustine lived from 354 to 430, when the Roman Empire was collapsing from internal decay and the devastating invasions of Gaul, Italy, Spain and North Africa by the Visigoths and Vandals. Rome was sacked in 410 and just before St. Augustine died his own episcopal see, Hippo, was subjected to a protracted and horrible siege. All the civil forms and institutions with which men were familiar were being torn to pieces by barbarians, and the Roman pagans, blaming the Christians for their plight, persecuted the Church to the verge of annihilation, until the Faith seemed but a little sputtering candle in a dark and vast universe of swirling depravity. The proverbial end of the world appeared so imminent that for nine years of his pagan life St. Augustine was a member of the Manichaens, a sect which felt that in the dualism of good and evil the power that ruled the world was essentially evil, and in some cases ended by worshipping the devil. The dark and despairing psychology engendered by these social conditions carried over

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while there are many things in University teaching which must remain tentative and provisional, one cannot accept this as an excuse for tolerating contradictions and ignoring problems that do not fit into the accepted framework. In any case one ought to be cautious about saying that University teaching ought to be tentative.

¹Max Otto, *Science and the Moral Life*, N.Y., 1949, p. 155.

²*loc. cit.*

³*op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁴*op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁵Quoted by Otto, p. 101.

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into St. Augustine's conversion to Christianity, and colored his interpretation of Scripture and his theological bias.

The thirteenth century, by contrast, was the culmination of the long, arduous and largely successful mission of the Church in Christianizing and civilizing the descendants of the same Germanic barbarians who had destroyed the Roman Empire. The Church inherited the inert body of the Empire and breathed new life into it. By converting the Germanic hordes and remnants of Roman peoples, out of civil chaos the Church created a new civilization, engrafting Roman laws upon Teutonic customs, and refining all that was gross in both through the justice and charity of Christianity. The Church instituted Chivalry, thus turning raw barbaric power against itself, so that robber barons and kings who had been nothing but boors on horseback became gentle knights who used their power to protect rather than to pillage the weak. Through her monasteries, religious orders, cathedral schools and universities, the Church had spread the learning of the ancient world, both pagan and Christian, throughout Europe. The thirteenth century was also the high water mark of Scholasticism; Albertus Magnus, St. Bonaventure, many others and St. Thomas Aquinas himself, achieved the greatest analysis and synthesis of Christian philosophy that has ever been made. The promise of a Christian City of God on earth was to such a great measure fulfilled that from a Christian viewpoint the thirteenth is the greatest century in human history. It is not to be wondered, therefore, that St. Thomas Aquinas, in formulating his theology, should pay far greater tribute to the active right reason of man in securing his earthly and heavenly salvation than St. Augustine had done in the fourth and fifth century.

These facts of history go a long way toward explaining the external causes of the differences between these two saints, but it is also clear that they differed strongly in their temperaments. In general St. Augustine is held to be more emotional, St. Thomas Aquinas more rational. Yet we should bear in mind that St. Augustine was one of the greatest thinking engines of the ancient world, that his pagan model, Plato, was essentially a rationalist, and that St. Augustine read and interpreted Christian Scripture in the light of his Platonism. Conversely, St. Thomas, for all his logical brilliance, achieved spiritual ecstasy a considerable number of times. Yet the general distinction holds; in the tradition of Catholic theology, St. Augustine is the Romanticist, St. Thomas Aquinas the Classicist. One has but to recall the circumstances and nature of St. Augustine's final act of conversion to understand how vital was emotion, instinct or intuition in his psychological

attitude and moral character. Except perhaps for St. Paul's famous sudden soul-shattering experience on the road to Damascus, when the voice of God spoke to him out of the burning bush, there is nothing quite comparable to St. Augustine's famous mystical intuition in the garden, described in the eighth book of his *Confessions*, when a voice awakened him saying, "Take up and read," and he took up Scripture and read: "Not in revelry and drunkenness, not in debauchery and wantonness, not in strife and jealousy, but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ." This passage, from the epistle of the first Sunday of Advent, revolutionized St. Augustine's life. From that moment, he tells us, "all darkness of doubt vanished away." After his riotous and sinful youth in the fleshpots of Carthage, after apostasy and the blackest heresy, the grace of God touched him by a Divine excess. He had the sensation of being turned inside out, or of suddenly seeing the world turned upside down, which for the first time appeared right side up. His thinking heart and feeling mind, lifted and contracted to a sudden ecstasy, experienced a deep, clear vision of spiritual truth. There is nothing sentimental, mawkish or abstract about St. Augustine's mystical experience, as there so often is in similar later accounts. But through this spontaneous overflow of God's gift of grace upon him, St. Augustine felt that intensely calm interior piety, that conviction of being God's elect, which rid him of all sinful desire and destroyed his former temptations and despair.

The theme of despair hangs heavy over the first half of St. Augustine's life. Despair was the natural mood of his fatalistic pagan world, living without hope of immortality; despair inevitably had followed all his sensual debauches, and it had also consumed his mind as a Manichaean, because he was by nature introspective and skeptical. For years St. Augustine had resisted the pleading of his mother, St. Monica, to become a Christian. Under the influence of Plato's idealism, St. Augustine's naturally skeptical mind gradually turned against itself. The skeptic who stops at one question will never begin to affirm faith through many denials; a half-hearted, limited Pyrrhonism, like the judiciously neutral "Que sais-je?" of Montaigne, leads to perpetual suspensor in disbelief. It is the life of a spider to live on the thin thread of self-conceit puffed up from spinning gossamer speculations that entangle the soul the more they are spun. But even as a pagan St. Augustine knew too much to be satisfied with this amorphous type of subjectivism. By his middle twenties he had absorbed most of the learning of the ancient world and was a famous professor of rhetoric; therefore, his skepticism was highly eclectic and not easily subdued, for it had an immense field over which to range. In St. Augustine the demon of doubt had to be ridden hard, forced against its will to turn against itself, until finally broken in spirit. Only then could his despair be come as much the cause of his conversion as it had been the result of his Faustian conviction that he was damned. Only when he had driven the demon of doubt through the darkest depths of despair did God overwhelm his skepticism with grace, converting him through a mystical experience to faith. Then he realized the utter misery of man without God, and in humility he cried the lyric invocation that has echoed down the centuries: "Lord, Thou hast made us for Thyself alone, and restless are our hearts until they rest in Thee."

The contrast between St. Augustine's ardent temperament and the calm majestic dignity of St. Thomas Aquinas is practically absolute. The phrase "Angelic Doctor," so frequently applied to St. Thomas, is truly a perfect description, for this most gentle and taciturn of men was indeed the most saintly of scholars and the most scholarly of saints. Without being in the least gullible, his mind and heart were as naturally disposed to belief as St

Augustine's were to skepticism. He resisted his family's attempt to force him to leave his religious calling with the same intensity that St. Augustine had resisted his mother's pleas to accept the faith. St. Thomas' natural faith, crystallized and distilled by reason and meditation, needed no violent subjective experience of grace to dislocate his nature into the love of God. St. Thomas needed no conversion, but had he been born a pagan his temperament would very likely have made him arrive at Faith through meditative humility, moving step by sure step, exactly and precisely, until by the concurrent action of his powerful reason and growing faith, gradually but surely he would have found himself breathless with adoration in the love of God. The cardinal place of reason in his character is indicated by Chesterton's statement that "St. Thomas Aquinas . . . is not at all rhetorical. There are any number of purple patches in Augustine; but there are no purple patches in Aquinas . . . His style is always plain . . . [and] he never darkens it by using words without knowledge, or even more legitimately, by using words belonging only to imagination or intuition. So far as his method is concerned, he is perhaps the only real Rationalist among the children of men." We should not suppose, however, that St. Thomas Aquinas was merely a mind ignited by grace. His meditation on the Manichees in the court of St. Louis of France indicates that humility and prayer, not reason, led him to the peaks of spiritual ecstasy. His mysticism, unlike that of St. Augustine, is not the result of a sudden absolute cessation of vice, but of the rational extension of his positive virtues.

III

In the light of these historical and temperamental contrasts, the distinctions in doctrine between St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas will be seen not as differences of principles, but of emphasis. The crucial points involve how right reason and the higher will are related, and what part, if any, man can play in securing the Divine grace necessary for salvation. The conflicting claims of reason and will have been applied to the nature of God as well as to man. Since God is a spirit infinitely perfect, there cannot really be any separation of the Divine mind and the Divine will, because God's reason or justice is equal to His power. Therefore, whether a law is just because God has willed it, or whether He has willed it because it is just, is a problem which does not exist for God. But for man in his fallen state this problem is paramount; part of the imperfection of man resulting from original sin involves the natural insufficiency and tragic separation of his intellect and emotion. In his natural state, unaided by Divine grace, man's moral reason is clouded, his higher will is weak, and the divided elements in his spiritual nature are in perpetual war with themselves and with the world. Unfortunately, since man in this divided state can know God only according to the light of Grace, his understanding of God's essential Being, the Oneness of His Nature, may come to his reason or his emotion, and in explaining his experience of grace he chooses the channel which appears superior to him. It is natural for man to then attribute his choice to the superiority of this element in God's nature. In choosing between these alternatives, as they apply to both God and man, the Augustinian is a voluntarist, the Thomist a rationalist.

The idea that the Divine will is superior to the Divine mind was inferred by St. Paul and Origen, long before St. Augustine, but the Bishop of Hippo was the first theologian to apply the primacy of will systematically. In *De Trinitate* St. Augustine contends that in man will takes precedence over reason on psychological grounds, because man is not the original master of his first

thoughts and has no choice in the selection of data upon which reason operates to acquire knowledge. Will is also held superior on theological grounds, as man is selected by God to acquire grace. But there is a difference, and a very vital one, between these two selections: man is free to accept or reject God's offered grace. In St. Augustine's theology, despite what Calvinists have said, grace is not irresistible. There is far too much evidence against the theory, attributed to St. Augustine, that the supremacy of God's will denies free will in man. Indeed, several early popes appealed to St. Augustine against advocates of predestination. And in his opposition to both the Manichaeans and the Pelagians, he clearly denied total depravity yet affirmed original sin, thus contending that man has reason and freedom, yet needs the graces of Divine revelation. To the Manichaeans he asserted "all can be saved if they wish"; and every attack on the Pelagians reveals his conviction that man has power to choose damnation. Under the action of God's grace, man's will is free to accept or reject God, so that his power for good or evil is immense. Under the action of original sin, the freedom lost is not the liberty of choosing good over evil, but rather the liberty of enjoying the good of original innocence. In understanding the relation of will and grace, the fates of St. Peter and Judas Iscariot are cases in point. Peter had denied and Judas had betrayed Christ; Judas despaired, hanged himself and was damned; Peter repented, redeemed his life and was saved. In the final analysis, despite his exaltation of will over reason, St. Augustine contends that although man cannot be saved without grace, man's liberty in accepting or rejecting grace decides whether he is saved or lost.

St. Augustine's reconciliation of grace and liberty is eminently Catholic, Luther himself was forced to admit that the basic principle of all early Protestantism, salvation through faith alone, was not to be found in St. Augustine, and he justified his stand by stating that Augustine had often erred and was not to be trusted. St. Augustine is also completely Catholic in other vital principles. He taught the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, the principle of salvation through both works and faith, the forgiveness of sins and the distinction between mortal and venial sins. He held the Church to be a hierarchical institution, having complete sovereignty in doctrines, and even Protestant scholars have had to admit that his "*Roma locuta est, causa finita est*" strongly implies papal sovereignty.

The historical influence of the Augustinian tradition can hardly be overestimated. It would take several volumes merely to describe the enormous effect he exerted on individual Christians. The whole Western Church, from Augustine's disciple Pope Gregory the Great (540-604) to the Councils of Trent (1545-1563) was dominated by his spirit and doctrines. St. Thomas Aquinas has been more often appealed to since the Councils of Trent, mainly because his *Summa Theologica* is far clearer and systematic, and because in the course of history since the sixteenth century man has been more responsive in the main to rational appeals. Yet St. Augustine was not neglected. The Councils of Trent, by reaffirming original sin and the necessity of grace, refuted Pelagianism; by asserting man's free will, his power to accept or resist grace, they refuted predestination; in both, the spirit of St. Augustine was maintained though modified in emphasis by St. Thomas Aquinas' theology.

St. Thomas is not so much the adversary as the successor of St. Augustine. He did indeed reverse the voluntaristic emphasis of Augustinianism by granting a superiority to the intellect in both God and man. Man's superior intellect is still infinitely surpassed by God's will. According to St. Thomas, a law is not bad because God forbids it, but rather God forbids it because it

is bad. The same applies to God's commands of good laws. Hence there is a natural law, intrinsic and immutable, created by God from His essence, and distinct from the order of revealed Scripture, though not contrary to it. St. Thomas' doctrine of natural law is combined with his principle that every man has sufficient grace not to do what he ought not to do, and that God never refuses grace to anyone who does what he can. As St. Thomas says: "It is common teaching that if a man born among the barbarous and infidel nations really does what lies in his power, God will reveal to him what is necessary for salvation, either by interior inspirations or by sending him a preacher of the Faith." The cardinal concern of St. Thomas Aquinas, as of all Scholastic philosophy, involved the reconciliation of reason and revelation. In his *Summa Theologica* intellect and will are perfectly harmonized; the will moves the intellect in its activities, and intellect moves the will by supplying it with ideas and objects. In St. Thomas' system the senses are the original source of knowledge, but unlike in Locke's naive theory of knowledge, the mind can perceive itself and understand its own nature by reflecting on its own acts.

In the great controversy of his career, against Averroes, an Arabian mis-interpretor of Aristotle, and his disciple Siger de Brabant, St. Thomas Aquinas attacked the theory that the truths of reason and philosophy can contradict the truths of revelation. The Franciscan, St. Bonaventure, and other Augustinians, pointed out the danger that the theory of the double truth would lead men to prefer the truths of philosophy and neglect Christian revelation. They therefore denied there were any truths apart from revelation, thus denying reason. St. Thomas Aquinas steered a middle course between these positions and vindicated both human reason and Divine revelation.

It is generally agreed that St. Thomas Aquinas' achievement was twofold: he defined the most acceptable relations between reason and faith, and he systematized theology. Probably no theory of the will has ever avoided every objection and doubt about the problem of evil, but St. Thomas' answer has been most satisfactory. His paramount influence on the intellectual traditions of the Church, from the early fourteenth century to the present, flows directly from his achievement. But St. Thomas did not begin a new intellectual tradition so much as he extended his inheritance. The list of texts of Scripture found in the *Summa Theologica* fills eighty columns of small print. St. Thomas quotes from nineteen Church councils, forty-one popes and fifty-two Fathers of the Church, among whom St. Augustine has a very prominent position. Out of the intellectual traditions of natural revelation he gleaned fragmentary truths from forty-six pagan philosophers and poets. St. Thomas Aquinas' important influence began at the Council of Trent, where his *Summa Theologica* was used in conjunction with Scripture and all important papal decrees in the restatement and clarification of the doctrinal position of the Church. Since then many other councils and popes have referred to St. Thomas' theology, and his influence has passed over into the catechism. He is the foremost philosopher in our religious teaching orders, and he has been widely studied in Catholic universities. Approximately six thousand commentaries have been written on the *Summa Theologica* alone. St. Thomas has anticipated and answered the chief heretical winds of doctrine that have blown the modern world off its moral orbit, and his negative influence in preventing errors has also been undoubtedly great. The revival of Neo-Thomism in our time, even in non-Catholic universities, speaks well for St. Thomas' enduring value.

Let us therefore sing the praises of our great traditions, and particularly

of the Augustinian and Thomist traditions, which compose two distinct and complementary intellectual forces within the Church. Far from being opposed, this marriage of Augustinian passion and Thomist reason constitutes a rich and magnificent unity, in which each acts as a corrective to the potential excesses into which emotion or reason alone might lead man. Like the Sacraments and the Mass in our traditions of worship, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas appeal to our *total* nature, and their combined systems of theology make it truly the "Queen of all the sciences," the spiritual culmination of what man, as a feeling and thinking soul, is capable of achieving. In 1748 Pope Benedict XIV gave full rights to both Augustinians and Thomists to defend their particular doctrines and emphasis. Therefore, although Thomism has been generally preferred in modern times, and has such outstanding contemporary advocates as Maritain, Gilson and Christopher Dawson, neither tradition is official, both are normative. The development of both traditions within the Catholic Church makes it possible for men of every temperament and in all ages to fulfill their spiritual destiny in the Church which Christ founded. Finally, by the study of the Augustinian and Thomist traditions in the Church, and by a knowledge of how these traditions are now operating in the world, we may achieve a true and full Christian revelation, so that in every thought, word and deed, in all worldly meekness and spiritual might, we may become worthy of being heirs of earth and heaven.



Apologia Pro Dilatione Nostra

In its popular as well as the classical sense, the editors of the *Newman Review* offer an apologia for the delayed publication of this issue and for the irregular appearance of past issues. It is relevant and indeed pertinent to point out that this particular publication is the record and journal of a work that is essentially intellectual—the work of the Newman movement and in particular the work of the Newman Foundation at Wayne University. Its particular aim is a religious evaluation and interpretation of the academic world as it actually exists and functions. It is obvious therefore that the program and activities of the Foundation must in a sense come first, for the ideas and perspective of this magazine flow from the work.

During the past months our whole program has to a large degree been conditioned by the confusion and worries entailed in a large scale building project and the mechanics of getting moved and settled in a new building. That we are proud of our new headquarters and especially pleased with the expanded and enlarged facilities the Newman House now offers is only to stress the obvious. We are encouraged to hope that in the future our publication schedule can more nearly conform to its promise, a *quarterly* review. We thank you for your patience and ask for your continuing understanding and support for our work.